I. INTRODUCTION
In Strickland v. Washington,' the Supreme Court defined the Sixth Amendment constitutional right to counsel to include the right to the effective assistance of counsel. 2 In its decision, the Court acknowledged that the role of counsel is critical to the ability of the adversarial system to best ensure that just results are produced. 3 The Court did not elaborately define this constitutional requirement; subsequently, lower courts have set the bar shockingly low. 4 This Article examines the quality of attorneys who litigate Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) cases, and concludes that a failure to apply a higher standard-beyond what was set out in Strickland-results in humiliation, shame, and lack of dignity for clients.
We define shame as the emotion we experience when we realize that we are not living up to our standards or ideals. "On a cognitive level, there is the painful awareness of being a failure, deficient, or inadequate. Shame can occur alone or with another who causes or heightens the experience. The shamed person feels exposed and wants to hide. 5 Humiliation is the emotional experience of being lowered in status, usually by another person. There is the associated sense of powerlessness. Shame and humiliation are often felt in combination with one another, and thus we will refer to both and detail how these emotions are generated as a direct result of our treatment of individuals who have been labeled as sexual offenders.
The volatile "arranged marriage" 6 of law and psychology in sex offender civil commitment cases requires attorneys to have a particular set of skills and knowledge in order to conduct a fair, judicious, and ethical trial, and to secure an accurate verdict. This is necessary to not only preserve the dignity of the legal system, but also to preserve the dignity of their clients facing what is most likely considered one of the most undignified adjudicative determinations: that of "sexually violent predator." Without specialized training and expert collaboration, attorneys cannot provide even remotely adequate or effective representation. 7 In this Article, we explore how an understanding of the concepts of shame and humiliation is critical to an understanding of the legal issues we discuss here, and we will "tease out" the meanings of these concepts in the specific context of the way that representation is (or is not) provided in SVPA cases.
We will consider these issues in this manner: Part II will discuss the application of the Strickland standard in SVPA cases; Part III will consider the significance of shame and humiliation in the legal process and the need for the judicial process to enforce standards of dignity; Part TV will demonstrate the harms caused by the failure to comply with even the minimal Strickland standards; Part V will explain the bases of therapeutic jurisprudence, which is vital to any understanding of the underlying issues, and will offer suggestions to prevent and minimize client shame, humiliation, and lack of dignity; and Part VI will offer some modest conclusions.
II. STRICKLAND AND SVPA CASES
For the past thirty-three years, the standard set out by the Supreme Court in Strickland has governed the question of adequacy of counsel in criminal trials. Under Strickland, effectiveness of counsel is defined pallidly as requiring simply that counsel's efforts be "reasonable" under the circumstances.' The benchmark for judging an ineffectiveness claim is simply "whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." 9 Post-Strickland cases involving mental status issues outside the ken of most lawyers'o have re-enforced what Importantly, in Strickland, there was no hint at all as to what its impact might be on other cases that were not criminal prosecutions, but that potentially involved lengthy periods of institutionalization." Writing about Strickland some years ago, one of the co-authors (MLP) noted that the availability of organized, specialized, and aggressive counsel in civil commitment is largely illusory, and the level of representation remains almost uniformly substandard.14 Then, fifteen years ago, in In re Mental Health of KG.F, the Montana Supreme Court acknowledged that the Strickland standard might not be a sufficient test of adequacy in cases involving involuntary civil commitment. 16 The court eschewed the Strickland standard of effectiveness and instead found that the standard insufficiently protected the "liberty interests of individuals such as K.G.F., who may or may not have broken any law, but who, upon the expiration of a 90-day commitment, must indefinitely bear the badge of inferiority of a once 'involuntarily committed' person with a proven mental disorder." 7 Importantly, one of the key reasons why Strickland was seen as lacking was the court's conclusion that "reasonable professional assistance"-the linchpin of the Strickland decision-"cannot be presumed in a proceeding that routinely accepts-and even requires-an unreasonably low standard of legal assistance and generally disdains zealous, adversarial confrontation."' 8 The K G.F. case profoundly recognizes the necessity to apply a more rigorous standard than the one accepted by the Supreme Court in Strickland-especially for proceedings that require specialized knowledge and expertise and have the potential to result in lifetime stigma and confinement. In the authors' opinions, there are no other 294 [Vol. 28
PROMO77NG DIGNITY AND PREVENTING SHAME AND HUMILIA77ON
proceedings more in need of a higher standard than SVPA proceedings, ones that are invariably and inevitably inundated with stigma, shame, and humiliation. These Acts apply to "any person who has been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in the repeat acts of sexual violence."' 9 Such individuals can be committed indefinitely; in a significant percentage of these cases, such commitments are, basically, life sentences. Such cases are, following the Supreme Court's decision in Kansas v. Hendricks, 2 1 classified as "civil" rather than "criminal," because they involve "involuntary civil confinement of a limited subclass of dangerous persons." 2 2 Such persons are not only considered dangerous but are universally deemed to be the most despised and heinous population of individuals.
2 3 Society's general revulsion toward this population is shared by judges, jurors and lawyers.
2 4 Although the bar pays lip service to the bromide that counsel is available for all, no matter how unpopular the cause, the reality is that there are few volunteers for the job of representing these individuals, and that the public's enmity has a chilling effect on the vigorous of representation in this area.
Compounding the stigma associated with individuals who fall under the SVPA is the complex evidence often produced at SVPA proceedings. 25 ("Currently, no other population is more despised, more vilified, more subject to media misrepresentation, and more likely to be denied basic human rights."). Although it has been common wisdom for years that the phrase "the worst of the worst" was typically meant to refer to those subject to the death penalty, see, e.g., Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 206 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[W]ithin the category of capital crimes, the death penalty must be reserved for 'the worst of the worst"'); in actuality, it is now generally reserved for this population, see Nora V. Demleitner In a previous article, one of the co-authors (MLP) argued, "humiliation and shaming contravene basic fundamental human rights and raise important constitutional questions." 3 1 These practices lead to recidivism, inhibit rehabilitation, discourage treatment, and injure victims.32 They also directly contravene the guiding principles of therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ) especially in the context of its relationship to the importance of dignity in the law.
3 3 We believe that nowhere is this more so than in the context of SVPA cases.
Shame forces a downward redefinition of oneself; 34 "the thrust of [shame's] aggression is to dehumanize." 35 It is bordered by "embarrassment, humiliation, and mortification, in porous ways that are difficult to predict or contain," 3 6 and is "one of the most important, painful and intensive of all emotions." 3 7 Shaming is public; its dehumanization and social demotion occurs when a shameful trait or act becomes "visible, and is exposed to others." 38 According to Professor Martha Nussbaum, when "shame is a large part of their problem ... expos[ing] that person to humiliation may often shatter the all-too-fragile defenses of the person's ego. The result might be utter collapse." 39 By marginalizing the rights of those who are shamed and humiliated, such individuals are treated as less than human. In addition, proponents of shaming sanctions fail to recognize that shaming sanctions convey the message that offenders are less than human and that offenders deserve our individual and collective contempt. "Sending this kind of message, even about criminal offenders, is, and should be, jarring in a political order that makes equality a cultural baseline."" It is hard to imagine how shaming penalties that are crude and degrading will foster respect for the law. 45 It is more likely that they are frequently counter-productive. The determinants of shame have been identified as:
* The shame-inducing event; * The vulnerability of the subject; and * The social context, which includes the roles of people involved. 5 3
We argue here that the shame-inducing event (in this case, the SVPA hearing) and the individual's vulnerability ultimately interact with a social context when the client seeks professional help. Thus, the entire structure of the SVPA system is one that is based on shame and humiliation.
Society constructs this population as "monsters" so that we can more easily dehumanize them. 54 Those subject to SVPA proceedings are marginalized even further and it is virtually impossible for any fact-finder to "connect with" or empathize with the victims on any level. 55 Nearly twenty years ago, a student comment noted that "it is a reasonable emotional response to desire revenge upon the sex offender, not to care about his civil rights, and to see him as less than human." 56 Recently, one of the co-authors (MLP) has argued that the use of humiliation techniques, "whether done in overt or passive ways, [also] violates rights to due process, privacy, and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment." 5 7
The public justifies the devaluation of the rights of convicted sex 47 It is no surprise that the vast majority of sex offenders self-report being humiliated on a daily basis. 59 Humiliation has been broadly defined as "the rejection of human beings as human, that is, treating people as if they were not human beings but merely things, tools, animals, subhumans, or inferior humans." 60 Humiliation can also reflect "a loss of control over one's identity," or "being denied a certain status in communion with others." 6 1
We have argued in the past that this dehumanizing treatment 62 ma have the effect of actually increasing sex offender recidivism rates. Philosopher Jeremy Waldron has noted that the predictable response to humiliation is for its target to "lash out at the humiliator" via a combination of anger and fear.M Aggression seems to be predictably, automatically, and at times, uncontrollably activated in response to humiliation. 6 5 While humiliation and shame share many characteristics, humiliation involves more emphasis on an interaction in which one is debased or forced into a degraded position by someone who is, at that moment, more powerful. 6 6 Humiliation is also interpersonal, rather than wholly internal In recent years, scholars and activists from multiple disciplines have begun to devote themselves to the study of humiliation and how it robs the legal system and society of dignity. 70 The Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies Network explicitly underscores this in its mandate: "We wish to stimulate systemic change, globally and locally, to open space for dignity and mutual respect and esteem to take root and grow, thus ending humiliating practices and breaking cycles of humiliation throughout the world." It is important to note that there is almost no empirical evidence that shows that shaming sanctions improve society and no empirical evidence supporting the position that shaming sanctions are beneficial to the victims of the offense.
7 2 There have been no comprehensive studies as to whether they are even effective, nor is there any empirical work through which the practical impact of such sanctions can be tested. It is necessary to contextualize all of this with the notion of dignity.
74
Professor Carol Sanger has suggested that dignity means that people "'possess an intrinsic worth that should be recognized and respected,' and that they should not be subjected to treatment by the state that is inconsistent with their intrinsic worth."
75 A notion of individual dignity-generally articulated through concepts of autonomy, respect, equality, and freedom from undue government interference-was at the heart of a jurisprudential and moral outlook that resulted in the reform, 
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not only of criminal procedure, but of the various institutions more or less directly linked with the criminal justice system, including juvenile courts, prisons, and mental institutions.
Fair process norms such as the right to counsel "operate as substantive and procedural restraints on state power to ensure that the individual suspect is treated with dignity and respect." 7 7 Dignity is demanded not only by American constitutional norms; 7 8 international human rights law also requires it.
7 9 These principles should apply equally in the context of the treatment of sex offenders who are-we can never forgetinstitutionalized as civil patients.
80
IV. LACK OF COMPLIANCE WITH STRICKLAND GUARANTEES AND THE RESULTING HARM
An individual facing civil commitment as a sex offender may be assigned counsel but is not necessarily afforded the absolute right to have an appointed attorney. 8 ' Jurisdictions vary on the availability and constitutionality of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
8 2 By way of example, if a person is indigent, Kansas has required the State to provide, at public expense, the assistance of counsel and an examination by mental health care professionals.
8 3 The Kansas Court of Appeals has mandated that if appointed counsel is not engaged, not responsive or otherwise not active, the court is obligated to investigate or to appoint new counsel declaring that there is a clear statutory requirement that counsel be provided "at all stages of the proceedings. " The quality of counsel and the threshold of constitutional rights have been debated in cases where defendants have sought to withdraw a plea bargain because they were not informed of the potential consequences of a sex offender conviction. The Supreme Court has yet to address this issue, and there is lack of uniformity in the state courts. New Jersey appears to be one of the only states that require counsel to inform the defendant that pleading guilty might qualify them for sexual offender civil commitment. 87 Other state courts have mandated a duty to inform when the plea would result in sexual offender registration.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a06 (2017).
8 8 Most state courts found no duty to inform, because civil commitment is not a direct result of the plea, but merely a collateral consequence.
8 9 A South Carolina court ruled that although the criminal conviction is the triggering event for the SVPA the attorney had no duty to inform the offender about the SVPA before he pleaded guilty. 90 The Kansas Court of Appeals reasoned that even if the defendant was informed of the SVPA, the chance of losing at trial and facing a longer prison sentence, would deter a guilty plea retraction. The question remains whether the defendant's decision to plead guilty took into account the fact that a potential life sentence response, the court underscored:
The problem Petitioners are experiencing is with the attorneys appointed by the Court of Wyandotte County. These attorney's [sic] of record rarely, if ever, consult with their clients during the annual review period and almost never send any documentation as to any judgment or action taken in their case. Hence, the patient has no alternative to but to file his own petition without the assistance of counsel. We cannot merely consider the constitutional right to counsel but must discuss that right in combination with the quality of counsel and the ability of counsel to minimize clients' shame, humiliation and the resulting lack of dignity. To be successful in this endeavor, attorneys must understand the contributing factors that occur during SVPA court proceedings. Some of these factors include: the effects of psychometric tests; the use of hearsay evidence; the lack of confidentiality in treatment and use of treatment-induced statements in court; and the resulting condemnation of judges.
Id
A. Psychometric Tests: The Scarlet Number
Expert predictions of future violence, which is "central to the ultimate question [of] ... whether petitioners suffer from a mental abnormality or personality disorder," 9 1 are believed to be necessary in the civil commitment of sexual offenders.
9 2 The concept that humans can accurately predict the criminal or aberrant behavior of other humans in the long-term future has created the need for the development of actuarial instruments that allegedly remove the "human" element of error when predicting future risk. In greatly simplified terms, there are two broad approaches to conducting risk assessments to predict future dangerous sexual behavior: clinical judgment and actuarial assessment.
9 4 The clinical approach requires evaluators to consider a wide range of risk factors and then form an overall opinion concerning future dangerousness. 95 The actuarial approach evaluates a limited set of predictors and then combines these variables using a predetermined, numerical weighting system to determine future risk of re-offense, 9 6 which may be adjusted (or not) by expert evaluators considering potentially important factors not included in the actuarial measure. Courts must contend with finding the correct standard that balances the potential for unfair prejudice against the evidence's probative value.
98
In spite of the knowledge that testimony predicting the future dangerousness of a person who has been convicted of a sexual offense is undoubtedly prejudicial, some courts have deemed actuarial assessments as appropriate tools that help the professional draw inferences about the potential for recidivism from historical data, or the collective experience of other professionals who have assessed sex offenders for potential recidivism. 99 Courts have held that the adversarial protections of crossexamination and rebuttal witnesses would sufficiently allow the defendant the opportunity to challenge actuarial instruments' validity. 100 This, of course, is only effective if the defendant is afforded an opportunity for a rebuttal witness, and has been assigned effective counsel who is knowledgeable and able to dispute the assigned level of risk. 10 In a thorough and probing analysis of these tests, Professors Eric Janus and Robert Prentky have concluded that, "to a greater or lesser extent, all ARA ["actuarial risk assessment"] instruments have shortcomings, and these shortcomings detract from the reliability of the instruments."102 Te authors note that there are three potential sources of prejudice from ARA testimony: first, that the scientific and statistical nature of actuarial assessments will unduly influence the fact-finder into giving it more weight and credibility than it deserves, and that the principle of "actuarial superiority" will exacerbate this tendency; second, that juries will ignore The end result is the assignment of a corresponding number or value to the individual being evaluated. 04 This number signifies either high or low risk of reoffending and becomes, in essence, a "scarlet number" that is comparable to the shaming methods behind the assignment of a "scarlet letter" used to humiliate or draw public ridicule to women deemed unchaste.' 0 5 If the assigned risk level generated by an actuarial tool is high, it attaches to the individual and is used to justify commitment year after year.' 0 6 The person is reduced to a statistic, and labeled as another high-risk offender unworthy of liberty and freedom. o7 This is directly related to shame and humiliation.' This impression of a dangerous recidivist sticks despite unanswered questions as to the ethical usage and accuracy of these predictive instruments.'
This issue was explored in
B. Evidence-Induced Humiliation
In addition to the stigma and shame associated with the actuarial tool assigned number, sex offender commitment proceedings in and of themselves include a handful of lax evidentiary rules that can further contribute to the individual feeling shame and humiliation during the 
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trial.
A broad spectrum of documents and otherwise inadmissible hearsay can be admitted into evidence at an SVP trial if the testifying expert relied on that information in formulating an opinion.'" 0 The courts frequently refer to the "professional reliability" exception for expert testimony as the professional reliability exception to the rule against hearsay."' A testifying expert will consider both convictions and charges during their evaluation, and mental health professionals often rely on charged conduct that has not resulted in a final determination of guilt, especially if those charges further support an antisocial personality disorder.1 12 Hearsay evidence, otherwise inadmissible, will be considered as long as an expert accurately testifies that the relied upon materials are the types of materials reasonably relied on to diagnose future dangerousness of sex offenders. 
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Evidence that was never adjudicated in a court of law;
18
Consideration of criminal charges that were acquitted;ll 9
Reliance on juvenile criminal records.1
20
Skewing the rules of hearsay and allowing the court or jury to hear expert testimony on potentially false or untrue information is directly linked to humiliation and exemplifies "an interaction in which one is debased or forced into a degraded position by someone who is, at that moment, more powerful."'21
C. Shame in and out of Treatment
In Treatment
Once an individual enters sex offender civil commitment, the focus is ostensibly no longer punishment but is, rather, containment with an emphasis on treatment.
122 Some states require eligible sex offenders to participate in treatment. 123 In other states, where treatment is "voluntary," heavy penalties, sanctions and the threat of incarceration directly influence and individual's decision to participate. 124 Many of the practices common in the treatment of sex offenders elicit shame, but this reality is often not recognized or dealt with in treatment. 125 The 
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and "the stakes for refusing to [participate] are so high that participation in treatment is almost compulsory."' 17 Many clinicians believe that an offender must take responsibility and admit to all offenses (charged and uncharged) in order for treatment to be beneficial and effective.1 2 8 During treatment, participants must confess to any crimes listed in previous documents and admissions may be used against the participant in future court proceedings.1 2 9 If someone's potential liberty is dependent upon taking responsibility for crimes or events that never happened, he or she would most certainly experience shame through the "downward redefinition of oneself." 3 0 Furthermore, being forced to agree with inaccurate or untrue portions of an offending history could elicit behavioral responses to shame, such as hiding, avoidance and masking the source of shame' 3 '-that might very well prevent the beneficial goal of getting to the "truth of the matter" in offending behaviors.' 3 2 Nothing so clearly violates "the dignity of persons as treatment that demeans or humiliates them" as shaming.' 3 3 Some experts have claimed that shame is the cause, rather than the effect, of many sex offenses. Shame is likely to be elicited repeatedly in sex offender treatment and individuals might experience feelings of low self-esteem, worthlessness, being defective or empty inside, and feeling unlovable.' 3 8 The therapist must be able to anticipate, recognize, and know how to deal with the fallout from shame in order to prevent individuals from becoming overwhelmed. 139 An important part of this is to establish a "culture of treatment" 1 4 0 so that "the client will not perceive himself or herself to be criticized, humiliated, rejected, dramatically misunderstood, needlessly interrupted, or laughed at during therapy.141
Even if participants fully immerse themselves in the treatment process, completion of treatment does not correlate with release from commitment. 42 Being denied the rewards of treatment success would undoubtedly result in a lack of dignity and a reduction in intrinsic worth.1 4 3 When the supposedly holistic and therapeutic goal of treatment is infused with shame, humiliation and lack of dignity, the prevalence of treatment-inhibiting mental health concerns such as depression, paranoia, For an individual to succeed in treatment while committed as an SVP, he must fully participate, potentially disclosing certain information that may be harmful to his legal case.
14 5 Clinicians working in the institutions are "required to resolve ethical dilemmas, which invariably arise ... by breaching traditional mental health ethical principles such as maintaining confidentiality and promoting patient autonomy." 1 4 6 A limited right of privacy attaches to psychiatric evaluations and statements made in the course of treatment.
1 4 7 "[Slexually violent predator evaluations fall within two established exceptions to the confidentiality of medical communications: the exception for public health and safety, 14 8 and the exception for communications made to a physician for a potential adversary's purpose rather than for curative treatment." 1 4 9 Some courts have held that the psychotherapist-patient privilege never attaches in sex offender treatment, because medical examinations are not intended to be confidential.s 0 The American Academy of Psychiatry and Law has voiced its concerns about such court-ordered evaluations: "Respect for the individual's right of privacy and the maintenance of confidentiality are major concerns ... [p] sychiatrists should maintain confidentiality to the extent possible, given the legal context.""' Regardless, courts have found that information elicited during treatment could be used in involuntary 144 The shame in retelling prior sexual crimes in a closed, supposed treatment oriented setting is further compounded by humiliation when those shameful thoughts, acts and behaviors are retold in court due to a lack of therapist-patient confidentiality. This lack of confidentiality would surely decrease trust in the therapeutic process and lead to failures in treatment. It is the antithesis of "a process that There is a significant distinction between feeling shame and guilt; shame arises from a negative focus on the self-one's core identity, while guilt arises from a negative focus on a specific behavior.' 5 5 "[S]hame and guilt refer to related but distinct negative 'self-conscious' emotions. Although both are unpleasant, shame is the more painful self-focused emotion linked to hiding or escaping. Guilt, in contrast, focuses on the behavior and is linked to making amends."
56 Most of the research argues strongly against "shaming" sentences designed to shame and humiliate offenders.1 57 In fact, shame is associated with outcomes directly contrary to the public interest --denial of responsibility, substance abuse, psychological symptoms, predictors of recidivism and recidivism itself. Judges seeking creative alternative types of sentences might instead consider sanctions designed to foster constructive feelings of guilt by focusing offenders on the negative consequences of their (upholding the admissibility of out-of-court statements made by petitioner to others, observations of petitioner's conduct made by others and on which the experts based their opinions, "group notes" and annual treatment reports, and "observation and behavior reports," notwithstanding the fact that they contained hearsay).
153. Instead, the goal should be to enhance "offenders' capacity to experience 'shame-free' guilt about harmful actions past, present, and anticipated future."' 59
D. Absence ofDignity in the Courtroom
The criminally based principles of individual dignity, "generally articulated through concepts of autonom, respect, equality, and freedom from undue government interference," 60 should apply equally in the context of sex offenders in civil proceedings.
Perceptions of systemic fairness are driven, in large part, by "the degree to which people judge that they are treated with dignity and respect."l61 The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that legislative enactments can result in humiliating consequences, and has underscored dignity's important role in the law.
1 62 In several landmark decisions, the Court has struck down both criminal and civil statutes that humiliate and shame the defendants.1 63 With these cases, the Court has acknowledged the importance of the role of dignity. M Elsewhere, the Court has specifically recognized the shame that can result when dignity is not present. In Indiana v. Edwards, the Court held that "a right of selfrepresentation at trial will not 'affirm the dignity' of a defendant who lacks the mental capacity to conduct his defense without the assistance of counsel."l 6 5 The Court stated, "in the contrary, given that defendant's 158. Id. 159. Id. at 717. uncertain mental state, the spectacle that could well result from his selfrepresentation at trial is at least as likely to prove humiliating as ennobling."' 66 The preservation of dignity is without a doubt, an important aspect of our legal system, yet when that system includes sex offenders, dignity is often absent.
Judicial integrity is the first step to preserving dignity. Judges have by and large, "bought into" myths about the high recidivism rates of sex offenders,1 67 and the need for sex offender laws in order to protect the general public.' 6 8 An individual facing sex offender civil commitment, will probably experience some lack of dignity due to the circumstances that brought them before the court, but the improper conduct of judges, based primarily on their disgust and/or misconceptions of those labeled sexual predators, can contribute to that person's complete loss of dignity. Pretextual devices such as condoning perjured testimony, distorting appellate readings of trial testimony, subordinating statistically significant social science data, and enacting purportedly prophylactic civil rights laws that have little or no "real world" impact dominate the mental disability law landscape.1 69 Judges in mental disability law cases often take relevant literature out of context, 1 70 misconstrue the data or evidence being offered,' 7 ' and/or read such data selectively, 72 and/or inconsistently.' 73 Other times, courts choose to flatly reject this data or ignore its existence. 174 In other circumstances, courts simply "rewrite" factual records so as to avoid having to deal with social science data that is cognitively dissonant with their view of how the world "ought to be. 
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A proceeding that is fundamentally unfair and heavily weighted against the defendant due to erroneous rulings by the fact-finder, will have a negative effect on dignity and potentially provoke feelings of hopelessness, unworthiness, and being regarded as "less than human." 17 6 This pretextual behavior by judges mocks constitutional requirements of dignity and is of no benefit to either the offender or the community.
E. How Attorneys can Combat Client Feelings ofShame,
Humiliation and Lack ofDignity
The Sanist Attorney
Sanism is an irrational prejudice of the same quality and character of other irrational prejudices that cause (and are reflected in) prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnic bigotry. 1 7 8 It infects both our jurisprudence and our lawyering practices. Sanism is largely invisible and largely socially acceptable.
1 7 9 It is based predominantly upon stereotype, myth, superstition, and deindividualization, and is sustained and perpetuated by our use of alleged "ordinary common sense" (OCS) and heuristic reasoning in an unconscious response to events both in everyday life and in the legal process.o 80 It reflects the assumptions that are made by the legal system "Sanist attitudes lead to pretextual decisions." "Pretextuality" means that courts accept (either implicitly or explicitly) testimonial dishonesty and engage similarly in dishonest (and frequently meretricious) decisionmaking, specifically where witnesses, especially expert witnesses, show a high propensity to purposely distort their testimony in order to achieve desired ends.'1 8 This pretextuality is poisonous; it infects all participants in the judicial system, breeds cynicism and disrespect for the law, demeans participants, and reinforces shoddy lawyering, blas6 judging, and, at times, promotes perjurious and/or corrupt testimony." In other areas of practice, a lawyer who is unable to gain control over emotional responses to a client might refer the client elsewhere for representation.191 But in sex offender commitment cases, referral may be less viable. Clients represented by Legal Aid lawyers or Public Defenders may have nowhere else to go, unless they can be transferred to a different staff attorney in the same office. Thus, in these circumstances, attorneys must insure that the competency of the representation is not compromised by the emotional interference in the lawyer/client relationship.1 92 It is necessary to stress that competency of representation is not a simple definitional phrase. If attorneys allow their emotional responses to interfere in their representation, they are further contributing to the lack of dignity for their client and an undignified legal system. 93
Overcoming Shame
Human rights and freedoms are granted to all individuals (including sex offenders) and human rights law provides fundamental protections without qualification or exception.1 94 Clients should be treated as human beings who are legitimately part of the moral and political community and should be acknowledged as both rights-holders and rightsviolators.1 95 It is necessary, in preserving dignity, to acknowledge individuals as persons and not merely as offenders. In sex offender commitment cases, the defense attorney is oftentimes the only person that can offer confidential communications with the client.1 96 Because of this, the attorney may be placed in the position of a pseudo-therapist during client meetings or interviews and preserving a traditional lawyer-client relationship may be especially difficult. 97 It is necessary for a well-qualified lawyer to be familiar with the language and concepts of mental health law.1 9 8 He or she should understand the possible effects of a mental disability or personality disorder on the client, the significance of diagnoses, and the common treatment methods, but needs to be cognizant of overstepping their legal boundaries of representation.1 99 Nonetheless, an attorney can employ certain methods that will not only benefit the legal case, 200 but also minimize the shame and humiliation that the client may feel in discussing past crimes and current institutional issues.
Judgment is for the Court, not the Attorney
Although the specific facts involved in these types of cases may elicit opinions and feelings, an attorney needs to refrain from judging their client as either "good" or "bad" and contributing to further humiliation of the individual. It might be necessary for the attorney to have the capacity to separate the act from the individual in order to render competent and effective representation. Value judgments on an individual's character hold no benefit in the analytical processing of the merits of a case and will only further an antagonistic relationship that has the potential to interfere with rigorous representation.
The general principle of condemning the act rather than the actor is in line with John Braithwaite's notion of "reintegrative shame" rather than "stigmatization." Reintegrative shaming treats the offender "as a good person who has done a bad deed," whereas stigmatization treats the offender "as a bad person." 20 1 Braithwaite, however, now realizes his point should be modified and made more subtle:
If a man rapes a child or is repeatedly convicted for serious assaults, is it enough for him to feel that he has done a bad act(s) but there is nothing wrong with him as a person? It would seem It is important to remember not to further shame the client by outwardly disbelieving his recollection of past events or his account of current scenarios. In treatment, the client is often disbelieved and verbally attacked by therapists and other treatment group members, 2 04 and in court, prosecutors use expert witnesses to find inconsistencies in the client's statements. How important is it to retain an independent expert in a SVPA proceeding? In order to be an effective advocate at an SVPA hearing, counsel must demonstrate a familiarity with the psychometric tests that are regularly employed at such hearings, 2 07 and collaborate with relevant expert witnesses who could assist in the representation of the client, experts who would be appointed by the court at no cost to the person facing sex offender adjudication in the same manner envisioned by the 202. Id. at 259.
Bertrand Russell, Freedom versus Authority, in SCEPTICAL ESSAYS 127, 135 (1963).
204. In State v. Mace, 578 A.2d 104 (Vt. 1990), the court ordered an offender's revocation of probation because the offender continued to deny the allegations of sexual intercourse in treatment and despite evidence and testimony to corroborate his claims, his treatment counselor insisted that he was lying and that this was a "stumbling block" to treatment. The writ of habeas was granted and the revocation of probation was vacated sub. nom., Mace v. Amestoy, 765 F. The complexities involved in an SVPA trial-mental health determinations, scientific underpinnings, actuarial tests and other scoring tools used by psychologists-all have an impact on whether the quality of representation afforded to individuals facing sexual offender civil commitment is sufficient to protect their liberty interests.
2 0 9 These cases are truly like no other in the justice system, and require a heightened standard of representation.
2 10 To meet this heightened standard, counsel must use every resource and tool at his or her disposal in order to be effective and to offer ethical and rigorous representation. Counsel must seek out and have access to expert instruction and opinion on the psychiatric, social and political elements of each case-skills that are most likely beyond most attorneys' schooling and legal education. Without such access, counsel has little hope of understanding the opinions and expertise that he or she will confront. An independent expert will minimize the effects of shame and humiliation that often accompany these proceedings by (1) showing the client that counsel is taking the case seriously; (2) empowering the client by offering another perspective in a trial that is otherwise weighted so heavily in favor of the prosecution; (3) minimizing the attorney's role as sole confidant and pseudo-therapist;212 and (4) educating the attorney so that he or she can be a better advocate for the client in court. Professor Amy Ronner describes the "three Vs" 2 20 as:
* voice 221: litigants must have a sense of voice or a chance to tell their story to a decision maker; * validation: the decision maker needs to take seriously the litigant's story; and * voluntariness: in general, human beings prosper when they feel that they are making, or at least participating in, their own decisions.
"The perception of receiving a fair hearing is therapeutic because it contributes to the individual's sense of dignity and conveys that he or she is being taken seriously." 223 In a recent article about dignity and the civil commitment process, Professors Jonathan Simon and Stephen Rosenbaum embrace therapeutic jurisprudence as a modality of analysis, and focus specifically on this issue of voice: "When procedures give people an opportunity to exercise voice, their words are given respect, decisions are explained to them their views taken into account, and they substantively feel less coercion." 224 Certainly, the Supreme Court's recent focus on dignity and the perceptions ofjustice are, perhaps, its first implicit endorsement of important principles of therapeutic jurisprudence in a criminal procedure context. How can legal representation comply with TJ mandates and the basic dignity concepts and structures, in SVPA cases? In an earlier article, the co-authors concluded that substantive SVPA case law tells us that the variables that make SVPA litigation different-the need for lawyers to be able to understand, contextualize and effectively cross-examine experts on specific actuarial tests; recognition of when an expert witness is needed; and the overwhelming potential for bias (making the ideal of a fair trial even more difficult to accomplish)-demands a TJ approach to representation. A cursory examination of SVPA cases litigated on the right-to-counsel issue demonstrate beyond any doubt that the "voice" required in Professor Ronner's formulation of TJ is missing, and that we have no basis on which to make a reasoned conclusion as to whether "validity" is present. This is even more important since the notion of "voluntariness" is certainly absent.
6
We believe that it is only through the use of TJ that we can best diminish the shaming and humiliating aspects of these processes. We know that nothing so clearly violates "the dignity of persons as treatment that demeans or humiliates them" as shaming.
2 2 7 To be consistent with TJ principles we must, rather, focus on reintegrating sex offenders into
